


TOP SECRETI.A.B. #4COPY NO. 297 July 1947INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARDC.I.G. REPRESENTATION ON U.S. GOVERNMENT MISSIONS ABROADMemorandum by the Secretary

Pursuant to a request by the Director of Central Intelligence the enclosed ^{Memo} paper is circulated herewith for consideration of the Intelligence Advisory Board at its next meeting ^{in early} of that Board

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Secretary, N.I.A.I.A.B. #4

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ENCLOSURE

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C.I.G. REPRESENTATION ON U.S. GOVERNMENT MISSIONS ABROAD

The Problem

To determine the advisability of providing for CIG representation on U.S. Government Missions sent abroad with the approval of foreign governments in connection with proposed U.S. aid to those governments. If such CIG representation is considered to be within the interests of the U.S. to provide routine channels by which CIG may be given the opportunity of providing one or more representatives for inclusion in these missions.

The Facts

Current trends indicate the probability that the U.S. will continue the policy of sending government missions abroad in connection with proposed U.S. aid to specific foreign governments.

Missions of this type provide a fruitful source of overt intelligence collection, particularly on the USSR and its satellite states within whose borders the collection of intelligence information is most difficult.

The assignment of intelligence officers to such missions from other first class powers is common practice. It, therefore, forms no new precedent subject to foreign governments' opposition.

CIG representation may be authorized from the standpoint of "performing, for the benefit of the IAB agencies, such services of common concern as the NIA determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally," as expressed in paragraph 3 of the President's letter of 22 January 1946 and paragraph 1 of NIA Directive No. 5.

Discussion

Foreign governments to which U.S. missions are sent in connection with proposed U.S. aid may be expected to have a strong anti-Communist sentiment and a natural feeling of gratitude to the U.S. for its assistance. These governments in most cases will be in much closer proximity to the USSR than is the U.S., and therefore may be in possession of intelligence on the USSR and its satellites not otherwise available to us.

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The difficulties now encountered in obtaining reliable intelligence information on Communist dominated countries is well known, and the importance of exploiting every possible means to increase those sources now available can not be overemphasized. Since we may expect that governments to which we extend aid will be willing if not eager to provide us with the intelligence information so urgently needed, it would seem mandatory to take advantage of these potentialities in the interests of the security of the U.S.

In the past first-class powers, notably the U.K., have taken advantage of opportunities afforded in this manner. It therefore is not considered that the assignment of competent intelligence officers as members of the missions might be considered as an unfriendly action. Their assignment for intelligence purposes, however, should not be publicized, and therefore they should be attached merely as representatives of the departments from which they were assigned to CIG, if applicable; otherwise they should be given an interim status from whatever government departments are represented on any specific mission. Furthermore they should be limited in number to as few as can effectually meet the requirements of all government intelligence agencies concerned.

The performance of this mission by CIG representatives is logical, because in this manner the special interests of all U.S. intelligence agencies can be met most economically without individual representation from each.

CIG representation on these missions can not be considered a duplication of the collection activities of the intelligence officers stationed in the foreign countries concerned because CIG membership in the missions may be expected to obtain preferential treatment.

Conclusions

That CIG representation on U.S. missions sent abroad with the approval of foreign governments concerned with proposed U.S. aid is required to obtain overt foreign intelligence information, particularly with respect to the USSR and its satellites.

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That routine channels be provided to inform CIG of U.S. missions being established together with a complete statement of objectives.

Recommendations

That the IAB approve the representation by CIG on missions as described above for further consideration by the NIA. That if the NIA approves this participation it designate the channels through which CIG will be given full information on all foreign missions sufficiently in advance to permit assigned representatives to be thoroughly briefed in the requirements of all interested government intelligence agencies.

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